Telecare Medicine Information Systems (TMIS) provides flexible and convenient healthcare for patients. However, the medical data transmitted between patients and doctors are exposed to unsecure public networks. To protect the patient's personal information, many authentication schemes are designed.
Introduction
Advances in computer networks and communications boost the development of However, since the healthcare data transmitted through the public channel usually contains the secret information of the patients, it is essential to use authentication mechanism in the TMIS scenario. Recently, many authentication schemes for TMIS [1] - [6] have been designed to protect patient's personal information. In 2017, Kang et al. proposed a user authentication scheme for TMIS [1] , which has simple computing cost due to the only usage of hash function.
They claimed that the proposed scheme could resist various attacks. Unfortunately, we find that their scheme still suffers from traceability attack and user impersonation attack. To enhance the security and preserve the efficiency of Kang et al.'s scheme, we proposed a new anonymous and lightweight scheme.
Review of Kang et al.'s Scheme
This section presents Kang et al.'s scheme for TMIS [1] . Their scheme consists of 
Registration Phase
To access the facilities or services provided by the TMIS server, the user must register in the server first by the following steps.
Step terminates the login request.
Step 2. The smart card generates a random integer u N and the current timestamp 1 T , and then computes ( )
After that, it sends the login request message
TPW L L N N T to the TMIS server via a public channel.
Authentication Phase
After receiving the login request message from the user, the TMIS server performs the following steps to achieve mutual authentication and establish a shared session key.
Step 1. The TMIS server retrieves the current timestamp ' 1 T and verifies the
Step 2. The server then continues to compute
L . If the two values equal, then the user is authenticated and the authentication process continues.
Step 3. The server generates a random integer a N and the current timestamp 2 T , and computes ( )
that, it sends the authentication message { } Step 4. On receiving the authentication message form the server, the user i U retrieves the current timestamp ' 2 T and verifies the freshness of server's time-
Step 5. The user computes the key Step 7. When the server receives the response message, it retrieves the current timestamp ' 3 T and verifies the freshness of 3 Finally, the user and the TMIS server can use the shard session key to encrypt the information transmitted through the public channel without worrying about the privacy disclosure.
Password Change Phase
This phase is needed when a user desires to change his password. For this, the user has to perform the following steps.
Step 1 
checks whether
A equals to i A or not. If true, the smart card believes the user is the owner and continues to execute Step 2. Otherwise, it terminates the password change request.
Step 2. The user inputs the new password 
Step 3. The smart card replaces 
Cryptanalysis of Kang et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we describe our findings that the scheme of Kang et al. is vulnerable to traceability attack and user impersonation attack. Before that, an attacker model [7] [8] is defined as follows.
Attacker Model
1) The adversary has full control of the public channel, but not the secure channel. That means the adversary can obtain all the transmitted data in the login and authentication phase.
2) The adversary can alter, delete or replay the data that he captured form the public channel.
3) The adversary has the ability to read or extract the secret data from the smart card issued to the user.
4) The adversary can guess either the user's identity or the password, but not both at a time.
5) The adversary knows the authentication scheme since he can be an outsider user or a legal user.
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Suffer from Traceability Attack
The main mechanism of the traceability attack is that the adversary can trace the user (patient) with the messages captured from the public channel. This happens when there exist invariant parameters in the login or response message. Unfortunately, in the of Kang et al.'s scheme, we find that the login messages contain i TPW , which are equal in all sessions. Through it, the adversary can trace the user.
Suffer from User Impersonation Attack
The main mechanism of the user impersonation attack is that the adversary can impersonate the user (patient) to construct the login and response message sent to the TMIS server and establish a session key with it without being found malicious. We assume that the adversary obtains the user's login message
TPW L L N N T transmitted in the public channel, the he can perform the user impersonation attack by the following steps.
Step 1. The adversary registers himself in the TMIS server with the registra- Step 2. The adversary generates a random integer u N and the current time-
T , and then he constructs the required login parameters Step 3. On receiving the login request message, the TMIS server first checks Step 5. When receives the authentication message from the server, the adver- Step 6. When the server receives the response message, the server verifies the freshness of 3
T and checks the validity of ( ) Finally, the adversary and the TMIS server establish a shared session key SK , with which the adversary can make requests for the private information such as medical records of the user (patient) without being detected.
The Proposed Scheme
In previous sections, we show that Kang et al.'s scheme fails to achieve the claimed goals since the user can be tracked through a constant quantity during the authentication process in the TMIS. To erase the mentioned security weaknesses, we present a new anonymous and lightweight authentication scheme for TMIS. The proposed scheme also consists of four phase: 1) Registration Phase, 2) Login Phase, 3) Authentication Phase and 4) Password Change Phase.
Registration Phase
When a user desires to use the facilities or services provided by the TMIS server, he must become the legal user first. For this, he needs to perform the following steps to register in the TMIS server. ID RPW to the TMIS server via a secure channel.
Step 2. When the server receives the registration message, he generates a ran- 
Login Phase
A registered user i U can construct a login request message to login in the TMIS by the following steps.
Step 1. The user i U inserts his smart card and enters the identity Step 2. The smart card generates a random integer u r and the current time-
T , and then computes ( )
After that, he sends the login request message
PID D E T to the TMIS server via a public channel.
Authentication Phase
After receiving the login request message from the user, the TMIS server per-Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics forms the following steps to build up a shared session key with the user.
Step 1. The TMIS server retrieves the current timestamp ' 1 T and verifies the freshness of i U 's timestamp 1 T .
Step 2. The TMIS server then obtains ( ) ( )
and checks whether
' i E is equal to i E or not. If true, the user is authenticated and the authentication process continued. Otherwise, the server aborts the authentication process.
Step 3. The server generates two random integers , T , and then continues to compute
After that, he sends the authentication message
PID F H T to the user i U via a public channel.
Step 4. On receiving the authentication message form the server, the user i U retrieves the current timestamp ' 2 T and verifies the freshness of server's time-
Step 5. The user then continues to compute Step 6. The user generates the current timestamp 3 T and computes ( )
, and sends the response message { } 
Password Change Phase
When a user desires to change his password, he can perform the following steps without any assistance from the TMIS server.
Step 1. The user i U inserts his smart card and enters the identity 
Security Analysis
Various authentication schemes have been demonstrated insecure [9] [10] [11] [12]. Thus, in this section we discuss the security features of the proposed 
User Anonymity
Anonymity is a mechanism that there is no adversary having the capacity to compromise the user's (patient's) real identity. In the proposed scheme, the user's identity is masked in parameters
With the protection of the one-way hash function, the adversary has no way to retrieve the user's identity.
Mutual Authentication
In the proposed scheme, the user (patient) and the TMIS server achieve mutual authentication with the assistance of ( ) 
Session Key Security
In the proposed scheme, only the user (patient) and TMIS server can compute the shared session key
the values required to calculated the key is only known to the user and TMIS.
With knowing the parameters transmitted in the authentication process, the adversary cannot construct the key.
Traceability Attack
In different sessions of the proposed scheme, the parameters in the user's (patient's) login request message { } 
Replay Attack
When the adversary eavesdrops the whole transmitted message between the user (patient) and the TMIS server and replay it later, it will be immediately detected as the timestamp is outdate in the parameters ( ) C ), the adversary cannot realize it. Thus, our proposed scheme resists replay attack.
Offline Password Guessing Attack
In the proposed scheme, the adversary can only guess the user's (patient's) password through ( ) 
Impersonation Attack
When the adversary desires to impersonate the user (patient), he needs to construct the login request message first. However, the adversary is no way to know the user ' 
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze Kang et al.'s scheme which was designed for TMIS using hash function and claimed to resist various attacks. However, we still find that the scheme is susceptible to traceability attack and user impersonation attack. In order to erase the secure drawbacks we found, we present a new anonymous and lightweight scheme and prove that our proposed scheme has better performance in terms of communication cost and security.
